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STATEMENT OF ISSDES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION
TO ENTER A WRIT OF MANDATE AGAINST THE
RESPONDENT/APPELLANT, CLAY K. IVERSON.
The Respondent/Appellant, Clay K. Iverson (Mr.
Iverson), has listed four major and fifteen subsidiary issues in
his opening brief. £&& Brief of Appellant at iii and iv.

How-

ever, Mr. Iverson appealed only the "matter of JURISDICTION" to
this court.

(R-138 and 141).

In addition, the first three

points argued in Mr. Iverson1s brief are all subsumed in the
jurisdictional issue presented above.

Mr. Iverson1s final issue

(whether the district court had sufficient evidence before it to
enter the Writ of Mandate against him) was not mentioned in the
two separate Notices of Appeal nor in the proceedings below.
Thus, it cannot be an issue on appeal. &££, e.g., State ex reh
Connor v. Irwin. 379 P.2d 309 (Kan. 1963); Moore v. Brown, 527
p.2d 132 (Or. App. 1974).

See also;

Carson v. Douglas, 367 p.2d

46 2 (Utah 196 2).
Nonetheless, the Petitioner/Respondent (Utah State Tax
Commission) has briefed all the issues Mr. Iverson argues on
appeal.
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gTATPTQRY PROVISIONS

DTAH STATE CONSTITUTION

A r t i c l e VIII.

Judicial Department

Sec. 1 . [Judicial powers - Courts.]
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a
Supreme Court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction known as
the district courtr and in such other courts as the Legislature
by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court,
and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by
statute.
July 1, 1985

Sec. 5 . [Jurisdiction of d i s t r i c t court and other
courts - Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in
all matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute,
and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court
shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate,
shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal
of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
January 1, 1945
July 1, 1985
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

T i t l e 59, Chapter 14A.

Individual Income Tax Act of 1973

Section 48
An income tax return with respect to the tax imposed by
this act shall be filed by:
(a) Every resident individual, estate or trust required to file a federal income tax return for the taxable year;
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(b) Every nonresident individual9 estate or trust
having federal gross income derived from sources within the state
for the taxable year and required to file a federal income tax
return for such taxable year.
1973
Title 59, Chapter 31.
Section 7.

Termination and Jeopardy Assessments
Procedure
Writ of mandate requiring taxpayer to
file return.

(1) If a taxpayer fails to file any return required
pursuant to Title 59 within 60 days of the time prescribed/ the
state tax commission may petition for a writ of mandate to compel
the taxpayer to file the return. The petition may be filed, in
the discretion of the tax commission/ in the tax court of the
third judicial district or in the district court for the county
in which the taxpayer resides or has his principal place of business. In the case of a nonresident taxpayer the petition shall
be filed in the third district court.
The court shall grant a hearing on the petition for a
writ of mandate within 20 days after the filing of the petition
or as soon thereafter as the court may determine, having regard
for the rights of the parties and the necessity of a speedy
determination of the petition.
Upon a finding of failure to file a return within 60
days of the time prescribed pursuant to Title 59, the court shall
issue a writ of mandate requiring the taxpayer to file a return.
The order of the court shall include an award of attorneys1 fees,
court costs, witness fees and all other costs in favor of the
prevailing party.
(2) Nothing in this section shall limit the remedies
otherwise available to the state tax commission under Title 59 or
other laws of this state.
1983
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH
000O000

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Petitioner-Respondent,
Case No. 20965
v*
CLAY K. IVERSON,
Respondent-Appellant*
000O000

BRIEF OF PETITIONER-RESPONDENT

STATEjlgNT OF Tgg CASE

Mature of the Case
Mr. Iverson has appealed the Writ of Mandate entered
against him by the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup of the Tax Court
Division of the Third Judicial District Court.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Court
On August 13, 1985, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup of
the Tax Court Division of the Third Judicial District Court
issued a Writ of Mandate and Judgment against Mr. Iverson compelling him to file state individual income tax returns for the
years 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982 on or before September 13, 1985,
The order further awarded a judgment in the amount of $1,097.30

for attorneys' fees and costs. Mr. Iverson appealed that order
on September 12, 1985.
Thereafter Mr. Iverson filed a Demand for Relief from
Writ of Mandate.
On September 19, 1985, the district court entered another Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Mr. Iverson1s Demand
for Relief from Writ and Judgment, but suspending the attorneys1
fees and cost award until such time that another hearing could be
held solely on that issue. The district court has not entered a
final order with respect to attorneys1 fees and costs.
On October 18, 1985, Mr. Iverson appealed the Writ of
Mandate on jurisdictional grounds.

ftelief Sought on Appeal
The Petitioner/Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission,
seeks on appeal an affirmation of the Writ of Mandate entered by
the district court.
STftTPHPET OF FACTS

The Utah State Tax Commission (Tax Commission) does not
accept Mr. Iverson1s "Statement of the Facts" as totally
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accurate, complete or relevant.1

The Tax Commission hereinafter

argues that entry of the Writ of Mandate against Mr. Iverson was
basedr in partf upon Mr. Iverson1s own misconduct before the district courtr and for that reason, here recites a complete statement of facts with references to page numbers in the record.
On May 20, 1985, the Respondent/Appellant, Clay K.
Iverson, was served with a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate
and Notice of Hearing, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 59-31-7
(1953), as amended.

(R-14).

The salient allegations of the

petition were that:

(1) Mr. Iverson was a resident of the state

of Utah "gainfully employed ... [who] earned commission income"
during the years 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982.

The petition further

alleges that Mr. Iverson failed to "complete individual income

For example, Mr. Iverson states that he is "a free and natural
person" and "is not the recipient of any special grant from the
State; that is, he is not a privileged person such as a firm,
partnership, association, corporation, franchise, ect [sic]."
Brief of Appellant at 5 paragraphs 1 and 2. To Mr. Iverson,
these statements of "fact" are apparently very important. Mr.
Iverson concludes in one of his pleadings that "My labor is my
property and is mine and mine only ... I do not voluntarily share
this enjoyment with the State of Utah through contract agreement.
I am a FREEMAN, A MERCHANT AT LAW dealing on a cash basis and I
do not owe a reporting to the State of Utah for some contract
agreement placing me under privilege, incorporation or
franchise." (R-16). Mr. Iverson's apparent purpose in
reaffirming his status as a "Freeman" is to suggest that the
state of Utah cannot tax his "cash basis" transactions unless he
has "reduced this [his] STATUS with equity contract with the
State of Utah under Civil Roman Law." (R-15). While the Tax
Commission is not entirely clear what Mr. Iverson means by
"Freeman" or "equity contract under Civil Roman Law," it agrees
with the district court that "a natural man argument doesn't make
it!,]" (R-235) or, in other words, is irrelevant.
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tax returns, Forms TC-40 or the appropriate alternate forms, for
the above-mentioned taxable years."

(R-3) •

On June 5, 1985 Mr. Iverson filed a document entitled
•Verified Statement of Refutation, Declaration of Status and
Verified Statement of Pacts." This document declared that Mr.
Iverson was a "FREEMAN, A MERCHANT AT LAW," that he had "rid
himself of TAXPAYER STATUS!,]" and that, therefore, he "no longer
participate Id] in Government granted privilege and [was] thus not
a 'person required1 to make reports."

(R-16).

This document

went on to make various jurisdictional arguments, declarations
and allegations.
At the initial hearing on the Tax Commission's petition, held June 7, 1985, Mr. Iverson challenged the court's
jurisdiction (R-160); challenged the court's denial of a request
to be represented by lay counsel (R-162); argued that the court
could not issue writs of mandate before a Tax Commission hearing
was held (R-179); claimed that the retention of an attorney, as a
member of the "judicial department," granted jurisdiction
(R-163); objected to being called before the court (R-178);
argued that the Tax Commission had abused its discretion by
filing its Petition for Writ of Mandate in the third judicial
district (R-182); and argued that the court's designation as a
"tax judge" deprived it of jurisdiction to issue writs of mandate
(R-188) .
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Also at that hearing, the Tax Commission called one
witnessf the Tax Commission employee who had helped prepare the
Tax Commission's Petition for Writ of Mandate in the Iverson
case, and unsuccessfully attempted to introduce an Internal
Revenue Service audit of Mr. Iverson1s financial affairs into
evidence.

(R-169).

The Tax Commission then conceded that the

court appropriately excluded the federal audit as hearsay,
(R-177) and proposed instead to call Mr. Iverson for the purpose
of confirming the allegations of the petition, namely that Mr.
Iverson was a resident of the state of Utah, that he had not
filed state tax returns for the years in question and that he had
received taxable income for those years.

But after Mr. Iverson1s

cross-examination of the Tax Commission's witness, it became
apparent to the court that "we're still going to go through with
a lot of argumentative questions and a lot of questions about
foundation, about the very nature of things."

(R-218).

Hence,

the matter was continued.
In the meantime, a Subpoena Duces Tecum was issued to
Mr. Iverson commanding him to appear and give testimony at oral
deposition to be taken by the Tax Commission at its Provo office
on July 19, 1985.

The Subpeona commanded Mr. Iverson to bring

with him various records evincing his financial dealings.
(R-93).

On July 15, 1985, Mr. Iverson filed a Motion to Quash

the Subpoena Duces Tecum, specifically on the grounds that the
court's jurisdiction had "been squarely challenged, but has not
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as yet been determined.*

(R-97).

On July 19, Mr. Iverson ap-

peared at the designated place for taking the deposition, but
refused to testify.

(R-230).

A hearing on Mr. Iverson1s Motion to Quash was held on
July 22, 1985. At that time, Mr. Iverson again argued jurisdictional issues, but the court made no decision.

On August 9,

1985, the district court issued an order denying Mr. Iverson1s
Motion to Dismiss.

That order acknowledged that Mr. Iverson had

challenged the court's jurisdiction on the following grounds:
(1) The statutory language of the "Writ of
Mandate" statute ... is unconstitutionally
vague; (2) The statutory options available to
the State Tax Commission (Writ of Mandate ... or Deficiency Assessment ...) violate constitutional guarantees to equal protection ...;
(3)
iThe Writ of Mandate
statute] is placed in the "Termination and
Jeopardy" section of Title 59 and no facts
have been alleged showing jeopardy; (4) This
Court has no jurisdiction to hear petitions
for a Writ of Mandate until a formal hearing
has been rendered by the Tax Commission; and
that (5) The Petition for the Writ was not
properly verified. (R-120).
The district court found that each of the foregoing
arguments, two of which are repeated on appeal as points I and II

in Mr. Iverson's brief, were "without merit."

id.

In open

court, the district court later explained that "I think your [Mr.
Iverson1s] arguments are totally without merit, but rather than
incite riot, or whatever, I simply chose to take the word out so
that it reads, "without merit."

(R-236).
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A third hearing was held in the case on August 13,
1985.

At this hearing, the Tax Commission called Mr. Iverson as

a witness in order to confirm the allegations of the Petition.
(R-233).2

Mr. Iverson then refused to take the oath as adminis-

tered by the clerk of the court (R-85A)3 and either refused to
answer questions asked by counsel for the Tax Commission or answered evasively.

(R-236, 237) . 4 Whereupon the court inter-

jected itself, disallowed further questions and answers and
ordered that the Writ of Mandate be entered.

(R-238).

The court

further commented that "if you [Mr. Iverson] traded cows for

Mr. Iverson had already admitted the essential allegations of
the Petition. Specifically he admitted that he was a resident of
the state of Utah for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982
(R-236), that he had not filed tax returns for those years (R158), and that he received income, or in Mr. Iverson1s words that
"I am ... a MERCHANT AT LAW dealing on a cash basis..." and that
"I could exchange my labor for property." Verified Statement of
Refutation at 2 (R-16). Mr. Iverson, of course, takes the
position that an exchange of labor for property is not income
upon which he must pay taxes (R-17).
Mr. Iverson later explained that he refused to take the oath
for theological reasons. The "Asseveration of Clay K. Iverson"
(R-269) states that "truth" as defined in section 93 verse 24 and
25 of the Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints is, in part, "knowledge of things as they are
...to come; and whatsoever is more or less that this is the
spirit of that wicked one who was a liar from the beginning."
With that definition of "truth" in mind, Mr. Iverson replied "I
can't" when asked if he would tell the truth. By his refusal to
take the oath, Mr. Iverson could avoid "participating with that
wicked one who was a lier Isic] from the beginning." (R-270).
4 The complete text of Mr. Iverson1s exchange with counsel for
the Tax Commission is reproduced in Argument, Point IV of this
brief.
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horses, you received income in kindf and that's deemed income
under the tax laws.

Do you understand that?"

(R-239).

Counsel

for the Tax Commission then asked the court to take judicial
notice that Mr. Iverson1s services, exchanged for property or
substance, were worth at least the minimum wage, which request
was granted.

(R-239).

On August 23, 1985, Mr. Iverson filed a Demand for Relief from Writ of Mandate and scheduled a hearing for September
6.

Mr. Iverson1s Demand for Relief argued that the court had no

jurisdiction over him because he was served with a Petition for
Writ of Mandate and Notice of Hearing rather than a Summons and a
Complaint.

Counsel for the Tax Commission did not attend the

hearing on September 6, 1985, although he filed an objection to
Mr. Iverson1s Demand for Relief, arguing essentially that personal service of the Petition for the Writ and Notice of Hearing
obviated the necessity for service of summons.

(R-134).

On September 12, 1985, before any order had been issued
on Mr. Iverson1s Demand for Relief from Writ of Mandate, Mr.
Iverson appealed the district court's Writ of Mandate and Judgment.

Notice of Appeal, No. 1 (R-138).

The first notice of

appeal states that "This appeal is made on the subject matter of
jurisdiction of the Tax Court relative to the statutes of the
state of Utah, particularly Title 59 U.C.A., as they apply in
this particular case." On September 19, 1985, the district court
entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Mr. Iverson1s
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Demand for Relief, but suspending the attorneys1 fees and cost
award until such time that another hearing could be held specifically on that issue.

The district court has not entered a final

order with respect to attorneys1 fees and costs.
On October 18, 1985, Mr. Iverson filed a Notice of Appeal from the order signed September 19, 1985.

Here again, Mr.

Iverson appealed the district court's jurisdiction, stating that,
"This appeal is made on the subject matter of JURISDICTION (capitalization in original) of the Tax Court relative to the statutes of the state of Utah, particularly Title 59 U.C.A., as they
apply in this particular case."

(R-141).

On November 18, 1985, the Tax Commission filed a Motion
for Summary Disposition with this court on the basis that "the
grounds for review [of the district court's Writ of Mandate] are
so frivolous and insubstantial as not to merit further proceedings and consideration by this Court."
position at 1.

Motion for Summary Dis-

This motion was "reserved for plenary presenta-

tion and consideration by the Court."

Minute Entry, No. 20 965

(Sept. 4, 1985) .
gPMMART OF ARGUMENT
All Mr. Iverson1s arguments are frivolous.

Point I
Section 59-31-7 of the Utah Code authorizes district
courts to issue writs of mandate to compel Utah residents to file
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their state tax returns if they have not filed them, but nonetheless have a legal obligation to do so.

Section 59-24-1 through 9

of the Utah Code, the Tax Court Act, provides that the tax division of state district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to hear appeals from the Utah State Tax Commission.

This grant

of exclusive jurisdiction to tax courts, however, does not mean,
as Mr. Iverson argues, that he was entitled to a Tax Commission
hearing and decision before the district court had jurisdiction
to issue the Writ of Mandate.

Point II
Mr. Iverson was served with a Petition for Writ of
Mandate and a Notice of Hearing.

Personal service of those

documents is sufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction over
Mr. Iverson.

It was not necessary to serve Mr. Iverson with a

Summons and Complaint because no "Answer" as such is required as
a responsive pleading to the petition.

Writ of mandate proceed-

ings are similar to injunctive proceedings.

They are specially

authorized by statute and thus do not conform to the ordinary
civil actions described in Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

The placement of section 59-31-7, the "writ of mandate"
section in the "Jeopardy and Assessment" chapter of the Utah Code
does not mean that the Petition for a Writ of Mandate must allege
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an emergency or jeopardy situation.

By the terms of section

59-31-7, the district court miiat issue a writ of mandate, upon
petition filed by the Dtah State Tax Commission/ to individuals
required by law to file their state tax returns but who have not
filed those returns.

Point IY
The evidence before the district court was overwhelmingly conclusive that Mr. Iverson was required by law to file his
state tax returns, but did not file them.

In addition to Mr.

Iverson1s own pleadings, and judicial notice of Mr. Iverson1s
receipt of income, Mr. Iverson himself, through his devious and
non-responsive conduct before the court (R-242), effectively
admitted the allegations of the petition.

ARGUMENT
Point I
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE
A WRIT OF MANDATE.
Mr. Iverson argues that as a "Tax Court," legislatively
created under the Tax Court Act, Utah Code Ann. § 59-24-1 through
9 (1953) , as amended, the district court cannot issue writs of
mandate unless the Tax Commission has first made a decision with
respect to that particular taxpayer after a formal hearing.
Brief of Appellant at 12 and 13. Mr. Iverson then argues that
"there is some confusion as to whether the general jurisdictional
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powers of the District Court spread over the Tax Court!,]" and
concludes "Itlhis case does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court and cannot be determined by it." Id.
Although the Tax Commission confesses some difficulty
in following Mr. Iverson1s argument, it is, in syllogistic format, apparently this:

(1) The tax division of the district court

has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Tax Commission; (2) Mr. Iverson1s case was not first heard by the Tax Commission; and therefore, (3) The district court sitting as a tax
court judge had no jurisdiction to issue the Writ of Mandate. To
make the foregoing logic intelligible, Mr. Iverson reads the word
"exclusive" in the Tax Court Act as barring the district court,
sitting as a tax court, from taking action in any matter not
first considered and determined by the Tax Commission.

Brief of

Appellant at 15.
The foregoing argument is demonstrably frivolous for
three reasons:
First, and most important, state district courts have
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandate because the legislature
has given them that power in Utah Code Ann. § 59-31-7 (1953), as
amended.

That statute says in relevant part that "If a taxpayer

fails to file any return required..., the state tax commission
may petition for a writ of mandate to compel the taxpayer to file
the return ... upon a finding of failure to file a return ... the
court shall issue a writ of mandate requiring the taxpayer to
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file a return* • S&S. Statutory Provisions at page vi of this
brief for a complete quotation of section 59-31-7.
There is no language in section 5 9-31-7 that states or
implies that a non-filing taxpayer is first entitled to a hearing
before the Tax Commission.

The following exchange between the

district court and Mr. Iverson best illustrates the convoluted
logic of Mr. Iverson1s argument:
MR. IVERSON: Well, I was under the impression, according to their petition, that I was
to appear before a tax judge.
THE COURT: I am the designated tax judge of
the Third Judicial District Court.
MR. IVERSON:
THE COURT:

As a tax judge —

I am a District Court Judge.

MR. IVERSON: I agree, but as a tax judge you
derive your jurisdiction through Title 59,
the tax —
THE COURT: No, I do not.
I am a District
Judge and I have all the powers of a District
Judge, and there is a whole chapter in the
new code that tells you of the powers of the
District Courts ...
(R-188).
Mr. Iverson1s argument simply ignores the language used
in section 59-31-7 that gives state district courts jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandate.

Further, Mr. Iverson1s argument flies

in the face of Article VIII section 1 of the Utah Constitution,
which vests judicial power in "a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other courts as J±£
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Legislature by statute may establish,

(Emphasis added)•

Article

VII section 5 of the Utah Constitution similarly states that "the
district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters
except as limited by this constitution or by statute«..."

The

legislature, in other words, has plenary power to vest jurisdiction to issue writs of mandate in state district courts.
Second, the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the tax court
division of the district court to hear appeals from the Tax Commission does not mean that the tax division may hear nothing but
appeals from the Commission.

The word "exclusive" in the Tax

Court Act obviously means that all appeals from the Tax Commission must be heard by the tax division of the district court.

As

Judge Rigtrup explained to Mr. Iverson, "This statute [59-31-7]
simply authorizes the Tax Commission to bring writs in a tax matter before the District Court Tax Division, to order you to do
something that the law otherwise compels you to do."

(R-184).

Mr. Iverson1s reliance upon Kennecott v» Salt Lake
County, 702 P.2d 451 (Utah 1985) is misplaced.

That case stands

for the proposition that appeals from the Tax Commission must be
brought in the tax division of the district court, as explained
above.

Kennecott does not in any way state or imply that all

actions involving taxation must first be brought before the Tax
Commission.

Mr. Iverson1s reading of Kennecott forcibly obli-

terates section 59-31-7 and Article VII of the Utah Constitution.
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Third, this court, in State Tax Commission of Utah v,
James M. Looney, 696 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1985) has already decided
that district courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandate.
Specifically this court in Looney held that "the legislature
enacted the Individual Income Tax Act (contained in Title 59 of
the Utah Code).

Clearly, the state has the authority to impose

on its citizens certain duties, including the filing of tax
returns."

Thus, the district court below had power to issue a

writ of mandate against Mr. Iverson.

Point II
SERVICE OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
AND NOTICE OF HEARING UPON MR. IVERSON GAVE
THE DISTRICT COURT IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
OVER HIM.
Mr. Iverson argues under Point II of his brief that the
district court had no jurisdiction over him because he was not
served with a summons and a complaint, although he was admittedly
served with a Petition for Writ of Mandate and a Notice of Hearing.

(R-248) . The apparent logic here is that: (1) Rule 4(a) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summons must issue within three months from actions commenced by the filing of a
complaint; (2) there was no summons issued in this case; and,
therefore (3) the district court has no in personam jurisdiction
over Mr. Iverson.

Brief of Appellant at 14.

This argument is unavailing for two reasons.

First,

filing a petition for a writ of mandate commences a legislatively
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authorized special action that is not therefore subsumed within
the ordinary or usual civil actions described in Rule 3 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As the district court explained:
THE COURT:
With respect to this kind of
case, it's a statutory injunctive kind of action, Mr. Iverson, and it's not a typical
civil case as you have cited several thoughts
about ... You were given notice of hearing.
You are not compelled to file a written answer to the complaint or suffer default to
enter against you.
You are basically required by the notice of hearing to appear and
show some cause why the court ought not to
summarily issue a writ of mandate against you
as provided by statute.
(R-253).
Because a petition for a writ of mandate operates as an
injunction to compel a respondent to file tax returns he already
has a legal obligation to file, the appropriate procedure for issuance of the petition is governed by Rule 65Ar Injunctions and
Rule 65Bf Extraordinary Writs.

Rule 6 5A provides in essence that

preliminary injunctions may issue upon notice to the adverse
party followed by an expeditiously scheduled hearing.

Similar

procedures are outlined in Rule 65B.
Thus, the cases upon which Mr. Iverson relies are
easily distinguishable.

Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164 (Utah

1971) involved an action to collect upon insufficient funds
checks.

The Murdock Court held that proper service of summons

was •jurisdictional" and explicitly stated that service of
summons could not be supplanted by "mere notice." Id. at 16.
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Likewise Piberboard v. Deitrich. 475 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1970) held
that a district had no jurisdiction because summons on a complaint to recover goods was not timely issued.
Both Fiberbpard and Hurdock are inapposite to issues
Mr. Iverson raises on appeal.

Those cases expressly involved

actions commenced by the filing of a complaint and did not involve, as does this case, a petition for injunctive-type relief.
The district court explained to Mr. Iverson when Fiberboard and
Murdock were argued below.

"No.

It's not the usual civil case,

and I donft think the Rules of Civil Procedure apply in terms of
requiring you to file a written answer within 20 days of suffer
default to enter."

(R-255).

Second, the Looney Court concluded that district courts
had jurisdiction to issue writs of mandate notwithstanding Mr.
Looney1s jurisdictional challenges.

Mr. Looney apparently did

not challenge the sufficiency of service even though he raised
due process concerns under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution.

In any event, the sufficiency of

process is jurisdictional and thus could have been raised sua
sponte by the court itself. S&&, e.g. , Lloyd v. Zollman, 590
P.2d 222 (Or. 1979); Estes v. Talbot, 597 P.2d 1324 (Utah 1979).
Since Mr. Looney was served in precisely the same manner as Mr.
Iverson teaa Brief of Respondent in State Tax Commission v. James
M. Looney at 3, copy attached/ Addendum I), this court should
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find in this case, as it did in Looney, that Mr. Iverson's jurisdictional arguments are totally without merit.

Point III
A PETITION FOR A WRIT OP MANDATE NEED NOT ALLEGE THAT COLLECTION OF ANY TAX IS IN JEOPARDY.
Mr. Iverson declares in Point III of his brief that
Title 59 chapter 31 of the Utah Code is entitled "Termination and
Jeopardy Assessments Procedure11 and that, therefore, a petition
for a writ of mandate brought pursuant to section 59-31-7 must
allege "that a condition of jeopardy exists." Brief of Appellant
at 19.
This argument is likewise demonstrably specious.

This

court has previously held that "the intention of the Legislature
... should be controlling and no formalistic rule of grammar or
word from should stand in the way of carrying out the legislative
intent."

Board of Education of Granite School District v. Salt

Lake City, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983).

Consequently, the validity

of section 59-31-7 does not depend upon any particular location
in the Utah Code.
not law.

Moreover, the title of Title 5 9 chapter 3 0 is

It is merely a general identification of the provisions

which follow.

The unambiguous wording of section 59-31-7 states

that the district courtfiJiallenter a writ of mandate "Upon a
finding of failure to file a return with 60 days of the time
prescribed pursuant to Title 59, ..."
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There is no requirement

that the court must also find "that a condition of jeopardy
exists."

Point IY
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD BEFORE IT SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO ENTER A WRIT OF MANDATE AGAINST
MR. IVERSON.
Mr. Iverson1s final argument under Point IV of his
brief is that there was insufficient evidence before the district
court to justify entry of a writ of mandate against him.

Speci-

fically, Mr. Iverson claims that the court forced him to testify,
despite "his rights to privacy and against self incrimination,"
and further that the only evidence adduced against Mr. Iverson, a
federal tax audit, was deemed inadmissable hearsay.

Brief of Ap-

pellant at 23.
These arguments misstate both the law and the facts.
As a matter of law, "the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination may be employed to protect a taxpayer
from revealing an illegal source of income, [but] it does not
protect one from disclosing the amount of his income."

United

States v. Daryl R. Jensen, Jr.. No. 82-1648, slip op. (10th Cir.
May 11, 1983) (unreported decision, a copy of which is attached,
Addendum II).
1980).

See also State v. Ponceletf 610 P.2d 698 (Mont.

Significantly, the Looney Court found the same "self-

incrimination" arguments (&&£ Brief of Respondent Looney at 5,
copy attached, Addendum I) now raised by Mr. Iverson to be
•totally without merit."
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As a matter of fact, the evidence before the district
court was not limited to the federal audit excluded as hearsay.
Any one of three separate factual findings support entry of the
Writ of Mandate against Mr. Iverson.
First, Mr. Iverson admitted both in his pleadings and
in open court that he received income.

For example, Mr. Iverson

in his "Verified Statement of Refutation" admits that "I do not
work by way of privilege but as a matter of right and lay claim
to this right as one of my God given Inalienable Rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and protected by the Utah
Constitution.
contract.*

In this capacity I ... work as a matter of private

In the same pleading, Mr. Iverson further admits that

"I am a FREEMAN, A MERCHANT AT LAW dealing on a cash basis and do
not owe a reporting to the State of Utah for some contract agreement placing me under privilege, incorporation or franchise." He
further admits that "I do exchange property for property and do
not engage in PUBLIC CREDIT.... My labor is my property and is
mine and mine only for the enjoyment thereof and I do not voluntarily share this enjoyment with the State of Utah through contract agreement."

(R-16) (emphasis added).

These admissions, made in unwithdrawn pleadings Mr.
Iverson filed, are binding and conclusive upon him.

As one

evidence treatise explains "Thus, the court must look to the
pleadings as part of the record in passing on the relevancy of
evidence, and in ascertaining the issues to be submitted to the
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jury.

For these purposes it is not necessary to offer the plead-

ings in evidence.

They are used as judicial and not evidential

admissions! and fpr these purposes, until withdrawn or aroendedi
are conclusive.»

McCormick, Evidence S 265 (2nd ed. 1972)

(emphasis added)•
Second, Mr. Iverson's evasive and devious conduct at
the hearing of August 23, 1985, can be and was construed as an
admission to the allegations of the petition.

Consider the fol-

lowing exchange between the courtf Mr. Iverson and counsel for
the Tax Commission.
BY MR> MILLER:
Q Mr. Iversonf will you please give us
your full name and address?
A Clay Iverson, 4361 West 11000 North,
Highland, Utah.
Q How
address?
A

long

have

you

resided

at

that

Six years.

Q You have been a citizen and resident of
the State of Utah since 1979?
A I have been domiciled in the State of
Utah since 1979.
Q Have you filed any tax return with the
State Tax Commission since 1979?
A

No.

Q What i s your occupation?
A

Creator.

Q What i s a creator?
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A Hany things.
Q Give me some s p e c i f i e d
create?
to

A I
~

don't

see

that

has

What do you
any

relevance

THE COURT: Answer his
question.
THE WITNESS: Create,
I guess.
Q

(By Mr. Miller) What?

A

Objects.

Q

Like what?

A

(No response.)

Q Mr. Iverson, do you remember
an
informal conference that you and I had on
June 20th at the Salt Lake County Library?
A

I remember a conference*

Q Do you remember telling me that some of
the things that you created were welding,
raising goats, performing odd jobs and
maintenance services for other people?
Do
you recall that?
A I have created those things, but not
for other people always.
Q

Who do you do them for?

A

Yoi me.

Poi God.

Q Do you receive substance in return for
these services?
A

No.

Q Do you recall saying to me at that time
that you received substance in return for
those services?
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A

I don't r e c a l l .

Q You d o n ' t r e c a l l t h a t ? Okay. L e t ' s go
through — l e t ' s g e t t h i s s t r a i g h t .
Do you
do any welding?
A

I know how t o weld.

Q Did you do any masonry — and I'm
t a l k i n g about the period of 1979 t o 1982.
Have you done any welding for anyone?
A
Q

(No r e s p o n s e . )
You d o n ' t r e c a l l ?

(R-236-238).
The foregoing exchange demonstrates that Mr. Iverson's
conduct at the hearing of August 23 r 1985 obstructed justice.

In

response to two questions/ asking what he "created" or what services he performed for othersf Mr. Iverson refused to answer.

In

response to a series of questions asking what occupation he pursued/ Mr. Iverson gave evasive and incomplete answersf and at one
point objected that questions concerning his occupation were irrelevant to determining his receipt of income. And in another
instance/ when Mr. Iverson categorically denied receipt of substance for services/ he contradicted several statements in his
"Verified Statement of Refutation"/ as quoted above.
When it became apparent that Mr. Iverson was not
willing to cooperate/ the court interjected itself/ stopped the
questioning and told Mr. Iverson "I'm going to compel you to file
a meaningful tax return within 15 daysr..." (R-238); later the
court stated "So if you don't generate wages, then certainly the
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food you eat and the clothes you wear and the gas you put in your
vehicle, and whatever you obtain by thievery or by some honest
means, and I'm not going to sit here and require counsel to go
through painfully question by question and have you avoid and be
devious and nonresponsive."

(R-242)•

The court was well within

its prerogative to terminate questioning and enter the Writ of
Mandate.

Again, this conclusion is supported by general evidence

law:
As might be expected, wrongdoing by the party
in connection with his case, amounting to an
obstruction of justice is also commonly regarded as an admission of conduct. By resorting to wrongful devices he is said to give
ground for believing he thinks his case is
weak and not to be won by fair means. Accordingly, a party1s false statement about
the matter in litigation, whether before
suit, or on the stand, ... his destruction or
concealment of relevant documents or objects,
...
all these are instances of this type
of admission by conduct.
McCormick, Evidence S 273 (2nd ed. 1972).
Third, the district court took judicial notice that the
value of Mr. Iverson's services, or his admitted exchange of
property for property, is at least the equivalent of the federal
minimum wage.

See Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Request

for Court to Take Judicial Notice, and remarks of counsel for the
Tax Commission and the court at (R-239).
Under Utah Code Ann. S 59-14A-48 (1953), as amended,
every resident individual required to file a federal income tax
return is likewise required to file a state return.

Thus, Mr.

Iverson would be required under both state and federal law to
file tax returns with the respective state and federal jurisdictions if his income was at least $3,400 for a married individual filing jointly.

26 D.S.C. S 1 (1982).

Mr. Iverson1s

income, computed at the average federal minimum wage from 1979 1982 of approximately $3.00 per hour, 19 U.S.C. § 206 (1982)5 as
explained above, for a regular 40 hour week is above $6,000, well
over the minimum level of income at which everyone must file a
tax return.

Even if the forgoing assumptions and computations

are incorrect, Mr. Iverson1s refusal to file his tax returns or
even answer relevant questions when ordered by the court, makes
an accurate calculation impossible.
CONCLUSION
Each of Mr. Iverson1s arguments are frivolous in the
extreme and should not be seriously entertained by this court.
This court has already ruled in other appeals brought by tax
protestors that state district courts have jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandate to compel individuals such as Mr. Iverson to
file their tax returns.

There are no relevant distinctions be-

tween Mr. Iverson1s appeal and those cases.
In addition, Mr. Iverson1s wrongful conduct frustrated
the orderly presentation of "evidence" in this case.

Mr. Iverson

For the first year Mr. Iverson should have filed, 1979, the
threshold was $3,200.
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has refused to testify at a deposition, has refused to answer
questions propounded by the court and counsel and by self-decree
argues that he is not a "taxpayer11 and therefore cannot be compelled to file a tax return.

In the words of the district court

•you [Mr. Iversonl abuse the system which you deem responsible to
protect you, but feel that for some reason you do not have to pay
your fair share."

(R-235).

This court should not permit such an

evasion of the tax laws to occur.
The district court should be summarily affirmed.
DATED this

^T

day of April, 1986.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

MAXWELL A; MILLER
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Div.
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ADDENDUM x

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

]

P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
!)

v.

Supreme Court No, 19913

JAMES M. LOONEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, STATE TAX COMMISSION

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
The a p p e l l a n t , James M. Looney, i s appealing an order
of the Tax Court D i v i s i o n of the Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court
finding him i n contempt of court for f a i l u r e t o comply with a
writ of mandate i s s u e d by the court below.

PISPQSITIQN IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Dean E. Conder of t h e Tax Court
D i v i s i o n of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court found Looney i n
contempt of c o u r t for f a i l i n g t o comply w i t h a w r i t of mandate
issued by the c o u r t pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. S 59-31-7

The State Tax Commission, on October 13, 1983, filed
a petition for writ of mandate, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S
59-31-7(1) , in the Tax Court Division of the Third District
Court (R-2)«

Looney was properly served with notice of the

November 3, 1983 , hearing, which hearing was continued until
November 28, 1983 (R-18).
On November 2 8, 1983, the State Tax Commission
presented evidence that Looney made sufficient income to be
required to file federal and state income tax returns for the
years 1979, 1980, and 1981 and evidence that Looney had not
filed income tax returns for those years (R-40-41)•

On Novem-

ber 29, 1983, the court issued a writ of mandate ordering
Looney "to file valid, accurate, and complete Utah Individual
Income Tax Returns, Forms TC-40, for the taxable years 1979,
1980, and 1981," with the State Tax Commission auditors within
2 0 days (R-4 2) .
Looney was granted an extention of time until January
27, 1984, to comply with the writ of mandate.

On January 30,

1984, the Tax Commission received what purported to be complete
Utah income tax returns (R-54-100).

These returns contained

zeros in all the appropriate blanks for reporting income.
(Looney did, however, request a refund for the amounts withheld
from his wages to pay state income taxes.)

In addition, Looney

had filed jointly but had failed to have his wife sign the
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ADDENDUM 1-L
EXHIBIT "A"
NOT FOR ROUTINE PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

MAY i i 19S3

TENTH CIRCUIT

dog

riTED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
wo. 82-1648
kRYL

R. JENSEN, J r . ,
Defendant-Appellant,

Appeal Frosi the United States District Court
For the District of Utah, Central Division
(D.C. No. CR-B2-00012W)

na Campbell, Assistant United States Attorney (Brent D. Uard,
iited States Attorney^ with her on the brief), Salt Lake City,
ah, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
on D. Roberts of Roberts & Roberts, Salt Lcke City, Utah, for
fendant-Appellant

fore BARRETT, McKAY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.

.RRETT, Circuit Judge.

Daryl
failure

R. Jensen

to

(Jensen) appeals his

file an

income

tax

return

violation of 26 U.S.C.A. .§ 7203.

jury

for

convictions of

1978

and

1979 in

Jensen was found not guilty

of failure to file a 1977 income tax return.
During trial the Government established that:

Jensen filed

appropriate tax returns for 1972, 1974, 1975 and 1976; Jensen
earned $31,492.44 in 1977, $38,715.42 in 1978, and $30,621 in
1979;

Jensen's

forth

earned

and

1977, 1978

and

1979 tax returns

did

not set

income and were completed with the words "ncne"

"object-self incrimination"; Jensen was notified

that the

returns were unacceptable as filed, that additional forms would
have to be filed, and that failure to provide

income for the

years in question could result in criminal prosecution, in 1977
Jensen

filed

withholding

certificates

with

his

employers

which he claimed up to 100 exemptions; and that
1979 Jensen filed withholding

in

in 1978 and

certificates in which he claimed

to be exempt from all federal withholding tax.
The Government
Jensen
right

also

in which he
to

support

object
for

to

his

introdu^^a

expressed
the

his

two letters
"good

information

position,

and

received

faith belief

sought,

suggested

from

in his

provided

what

legal

actions

the

Government should take with regard to challenging the validity
of his claims."

[Appellant's brief at p. 3 ] .

Jensen did not
closing

arguments

testify
of

or call any witnesses.

c-nsel,

Jensen's good faith esse:

the

district

Prior to

court

ruled:

en of his Fifth Air.encr.ent privilege
-2-

efusal to provide income information

did not in any way

e the willfulness of his actions; Jensen's state of mind
-vis his assertion of the privilege was "out of the case"
:ould not, as a matter of lawf justify his failure to file
:urn; and that Jensen could not mention the Fifth Amendment
ilege or argue its applicability during his closing argu-

On appeal Jensen contends that:
t

to

object,

upon

the

Fifth

(1)

an individual has a

Amendment

grounds

of

self

irdnation, to individual questions on a tax return, and the
ie of

the

validity

of

one's

assertion

of

his

privilege

:ld be submitted to a jury with appropriate instructions;
a

good

faith,

though

erroneous,

assertion

of

a

Fifth

ndnent privilege in response to an individual question on a
return is a defense to a prosecution -for willful failure to
e a return?

(3)

the district

court

erred

in failing to

>truct on the good faith defense, and its definition of willL did not explicitly include the good

faith defense;

(4)

* district court improperly limited the argument of counsel;
d

(5)

the evidence

was insufficient

to establish beyond a

asonable doubt the willfulness of his conduct or a lack of
>od faith in asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege.
I.
Jensen contends that an individual has a right to object,
pon

the

Fifth

Amendment

grcunds

ncividual questions on a tax

of

cturn.
-3-

self

incrimination,

to

Jensen further contends

that once an individual has asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege, the validity of the assertion must be submitted to the
Me disagree.

jury under appropriate instructions.
The

Fifth

Amendment• privilege

against

self

incrimination

does not allow an individual to-refuse to provide any information on a tax return.

In United States v. Moore, 692 F.2d 95,

97 (10th Cir. 1979) we stated:
The Supreme Court has held the Fifth Amendment is not a
defense for failing to* make any tax return, United
States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 47 S.Ct. 607, 71
L.Ed. 1037 (1927), although a Fifth Amendment objection
can be raised in response to a particular question on
the return if • the question calls for a privileged
answerSee Garner v. United States , 424 U.S. 648, ~96
S.Ct. 1178, 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976). This Court held in
United States v. Irwin, 561 F.2d 198, 201 (10th Cir.
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1012, 98 S.Ct. 725, 54
L.Ed.2d 755 (1978) that a tax return containing no
information but a general objection based on the Fifth
Amendment did not constitute a return as required by
the Internal Revenue Code, and did not contain a claim
sufficiently specific to invoke Fifth Amendment protection.
See also United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248 (10th Cir. 1979),
cert,

denied

444 U.S. 917

(1979).

Ue

hold

entitled

to make a blanket Fifth Amendment

pleting

the

returns?

thereto

was

inappropriate.

accordingly,

an

Although

Jensen

was

not

objection to com-

instruction
the

Fifth

relative
Amendment

privilege against self incrimination may be emrdcved to orotect
* -taxpayer from revealing an illegal source of income, it does
not

protect

one

from

disclosing

th*

amount

of

his

income.

United States v» Brown, supra.
Jensen

contends

that

his

rd
-4-

faith,

though

erroneous,

serticn of his Fifth Amendment

piivnege

an response to an

dividual question on a tax return is a defense to a prosecuoa fox—willful—failure-to- £ile-a tax_return^

This contention

meritless.
In United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976) the
ipreme
icome

Court
tax

held

statutes

that

willfulness

"simply

means

iolaticn of a known legal duty."
f his

legal

obligation

to

file

in
a

the

context

voluntary,

of

the

intentional

That Jensen was fully aware
a completed

tax. return by

etting forth his earned income is revealed by the appropriate
eturns he filed prior to 1977*

The district court's rejection

>f Jensen's good faith argument was correct:
I'm going to instruct the jury that it is an
established rule of law that the Fifth Amendment
privilege doesn't excuse the taxpayer from his duty to
prepare and file a tax return and it doesn't justify
his* refusal to file a return within the meaning of the
Internal Revenue Code. If that were the ca§e, anybody
that had some notion about what the law is and that it
would excuse them, however outlandish that notion is,
they would have a good faith defense.
[R.# Vol* V at p. 54].

Jensen's good faith reason for violat-

ing a known legal duty is irrelevant.
566

F.2d

(1978).
parameters

702

(10th

Jensen.'s
of

incrimination

the

Cir.
own
Fifth

1977),

'.United States v. Dillon,

cert,

rationalization
Amendment

denied,
of

privilege

435
the

U.S. 971
protective

against

self

is of nc moment, when, as h*re, he attempts to

adopt an individual standard different from that applicable to
the remainder of the citizenry „ In United States v. ware, 60S
F.2d 400, 406 (10th Cir..1979) *t stated:
•5-

The defendant contends that his personal belief in what
the law is, or should be, supersedes the federal
Constitution and statutes as construed and applied by
the Supreme Court*
If each citizen is a "law unto
himself, government will exist in name only. * See
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-167, 25
L.LQ.
244 (1879), and United States v. Grismore, 564
F.2d 929, 932-933 (10th Cir. 1977).
Jensen's
failing
merit.

to

contention
instruct

on

that
his

the
good

district
faith

court

defense

erred
is

in

without

In United States v. Pomponio, supra, the Court specif-

ically held that where a trial judge adequately
M

willfulness,

[a3n

unnecessary."

additional

instruction

instructs on

on good

faith

[is]

429 'U.S. at p. 13.
II.

Jensen contends

that

the district

court

erred

in ruling

that he could not argue his good faith assertion of the Fifth
Amendment

privilege

arguments.

against self incrimination

during

closing

\Je hold the district court did not err in limiting

Jensen's closing argument.
As set forth above, the Fifth Amendment

privilege against

self incrimination does not allow an individual
provide

the

amount

of

States v. Moore, supra.
not

a defense

to

a

his

income

on

a

tax

to refuse to

return.

United

Also, a demonstration of good faith is

charge

of

willfully

failing

to file an

income tax return, when, as here, it is shown that the defendant

intentionally

return.

United

stances, we hold

violated

his

known

States v. DiTlrn,

legal

supra.

duty

Under

to

file a

such circum-

the distric: court properly limited Jensen's
-6-

III.
Jensen contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient
establish beyond a reasonable doubt his willfulness in failto file appropriate returns and his lack of good faith in
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.

\le hold the

dence was more than sufficient to establish beyond a reasone doubt that Jensen willfully violated his known legal duty
file a return*
AFFIRMED.
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"One need not be a criminal to claim Fifth Ammendment
privileges, it applies to Civil suits as well."
(Isaacs v U.S., 256, F2d., 654.)
"The privilege is not ordinarily dependant upon the nature
of the proceedings... It applies alike to Civil and Crimina]
proceedings,..."
(McCarthy v Arndstein, 266,U.S.,
34, 40.)
";but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's
own testimony, or of his private papers to be used as
evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods,
is within the condemnation of that judgement."
(Boyd v U.S., 116,U.S., 616, 630
"We find it intolerable that one Constitutional Right
should have to be surrendered in order to assert another."
(Simmons v U.S. 390, U.S., 377,
394.)
The Third District Court ordered Appellant to file;
"'valid, accurate, and complete1 Utah individual income
tax return forms TC40, for the taxable years 1979, 1980,
and 1981, reflecting wages as income,..."
(Finding of fact, conclusion
of law and order pg. 7 (2a) )
or face incarceration for (30) days.
(finding of fact, conclusion of
law and order pg. 7, (2) )
The Third District Court's order, issued under authority of
Mandamus (Mandate), amounts to the compelling of Appellant to
surrender one Constitutional Right to assert another.
This Order of the Court should not stand.
ARGUMENT IV
The unlawful attempt to convert the claim of a Constitutional
Right into a crime, (contempt)
The Appellant, a Natural Citizen, having NO DUTY to the State,
and having insufficient "income" to be required to file an income
tax return, cannot be compelled to disclose private information as
to Appellant's wages, or "Compensation for Services," which do not
constitute fIncome".

